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Electricity subsidies in Uganda have been pervasive in support of industrial output and 
government revenues since 2005, until their reduction in January 2012. While economic 
theory suggests that market mechanisms maximise social welfare, the necessity for subsidies 
arises when a markets fail. However, market failure alone is not a sufficient condition to 
provide subsidies, as they are costly, and therefore have to be properly targeted and justified.  
This research seeks to establish the relationship between electricity subsidies, on the one hand 
and industrial output and government revenues in Uganda. It also attempts to ascertain the 
equitability of the electricity subsidy policy. 
 
Information and data was gathered from secondary sources in Uganda on electricity subsidies, 
industrial output and revenues during the period 2005 to 2012. For an empirical investigation 
of the costs and benefits of electricity subsidies in Uganda, certain logical relationships are 
identified in the study to guide the empirical investigation and the analyses. It is assumed that 
government revenues were dependent on electricity subsidies and industrial output during the 
period under investigation, in order to maintain social welfare. It was also argued that the 
maintenance of industrial output through electricity subsidies support was justified given that 
about one third of Uganda total revenues are contributed by the manufacturing sub-sector. To 
ascertain the extent of vertical equity, the research also investigated the benefit incident of 
electricity subsides, from a macro-level standpoint. This is pertinent given that only 11 per 
cent of Ugandans have access to grid-power and electricity use favours higher income, urban 
end-users.  
 
Secondary data on excise and corporate tax collections and electricity subsidies provided to 
end-users in Uganda during period are statistically analysed for relational effects using 




very strong relationships between excise and corporate tax revenues, on the one hand, and 
electricity subsidies. Electricity subsidies were found to be positively related to both excise 
and corporate tax revenues and industrial output during the period under study. From the 
evidence, the overall objective of the electricity subsidy policy seems to have been attained, 
in as far as revenues base was protected and industrial output was maintained. The evidence 
also reveals that at a macro-level, end-user beneficiaries of subsidies in the manufacturing 
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Uganda experienced disruption in electricity supply during 2005, as a result of a severe 
decline in electricity supply generation. The decline in electricity supply was a result of a 
significant decline in hydro power generation, which contributed 99.9 per cent of total 
electricity supply (Bank of Uganda, 2006, p. 99). Hydropower generation had been 
severely constrained as a result of increased drought that beset the entire East African 
region since 2002.  
 
The drought led to constraints in electricity supplied from existing relatively cheaper 
hydropower generation sources that Uganda traditionally relied on.  The impact of the 
drought was subsequently evident with increased power blackouts.  The number of 
industrial consumers consequently declined, on a year-on-year basis, by 5.5 per cent and 
85.4 per cent in 2004 and 2005 respectively (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development, 2011, p. 6). 
 
It was anticipated that a decline in electricity supply would lead to a reduction in industrial 
output, and consequently negatively impact government revenues. Government was 
therefore prompted to intervene to stem the anticipated loss in industrial output and 
revenues by putting in place emergency power generation measures. Other economy-wide 
implication of the electricity supply shortfall included a possible spiral impact with a 
decline in the supply of goods, increasing price inflation and a deterioration in the overall 
performance of the economy. 
 
The Uganda government was forced to contract privately operated petroleum-based 




electricity supply costs. Increased supply from the more expensive emergency power 
plants, without a commensurate increase in electricity tariffs, also required government to 
provide end-user subsidies. Even though end-user electricity tariffs were increased 
successively in 2005 and 2006, the increases were not sufficient to meet electricity supply 
costs entirely. Government believed that the institution of fully cost-reflective tariffs would 
have led to significant political, social and economic shocks.  It is noteworthy that  
substantial lobbying and pressure by industrialists and other consumers to reduce tariffs 
gained ground, subsequently leading to Government temporarily reducing electricity tariffs 
in January 2009.  
 
As a result of the reduction in tariffs without a commensurate lowering of the costs of 
electricity supply generation, the Government’s obligation to provide subsidies to the 
electricity sector increased.  In order to prevent haemorrhage of the public purse as a result 
of increasing financing shortfalls in the electricity sector, Government was compelled to 
increasing tariffs in March 2011.  
 
Government’s provision of direct budget subsidies effectively lasted from June 2005 until 
March 2011,  in addition to the provision of tax rebates for fuel used in thermal electricity 
generation plants. The increase in electricity tariffs and reduction in the provision of direct 
budget subsides was only possible upon the increase of significant hydro power generation 
supply from the 250 MW Bujagali Hydropower Project, which source was cheaper than 
the petroleum based generation plants.  
 
The return to reliance on hydro-power based sources of electricity supply reduced 




instituted. Arguments against instituting fully cost-reflective electricity tariffs were 
premised on maintaining similar tariffs for Ugandan consumers, comparable to those paid 
by end-users in neighbouring countries. This argument was particularly advanced by 
industrial and private sector players who contended that they would be less competitive 
with competitors from neighbouring countries and thus be forced out of business. It is 
evident that an in-depth assessment of subsidy policy was required to understand its costs, 
benefits and trade-offs. 
 
The study therefore attempts a critical assessment of Uganda’s electricity subsidy policy 
between 2005 and 2011 in order to contribute to understanding its costs, benefits and trade-
offs.  An explanation of the rational for the electricity subsidy policy from an empirical 
and theoretical standpoint, seeks to enable policy makers understand why and when 
electricity subsidies should be necessary, and how best to implement subsidy interventions, 
if at all it is necessary, in the future. 
 
 
1.1 Overview of Uganda’s Electricity Sector 
 
Electricity use on Uganda is highly limited, with only a 12% national grid electrification 
rate being recorded in 2011 (Ministry of Energy, 2011). Furthermore, given that Uganda’s 
urbanisation rate is only 14.6 per cent, a vast majority of the population are rural based in 
are relatively poorer than urban Ugandans (UBOS, 2012]. A key characteristic of the 
electricity sector in Uganda with respect to use is that it is concentrated in urban and 





Electricity use in Uganda is also mostly used by industrial consumers, who accounted for 
64 per cent electricity consumption in 2012 (Electricity Regulatory Authority, 2012). 
Commercial and household electricity consumers accounted for 12 and 24 per cent 
respectively. This reveals that the industrial sector is the most significant in terms of 
electricity consumption.  
 
Before the onset of the electricity crisis in 2004, Uganda’s main source of electricity was 
from hydropower generation (Bank of Uganda, 2006, p.99).  The total national electricity 
generation capacity amounted to 1,895.6 GWhrs in 2004, with the hydropower generation 
contributing 1,894.5GWhrs, equivalent to 99.9 per cent of total electricity generation.  
 
As a result of delays in the construction of planned hydropower based electricity 
generation capacity, unprecedented power shortages occurred. It was evident that this 
would negatively impact on government revenues, economic growth and ultimately 
constrain the achievement of the Government’s socio-economic objectives. In response, 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) were contracted by Government to install thermal 
fuel based electricity generation plants on an emergency basis. These plants supplied 
electricity significantly more expensive than from hydro-power sources; which 
substantially increased electricity supply costs. Government was compelled to extend 
direct subsidies from the budget to electricity consumers, in addition to tax rebates being 
provided to petroleum based electricity generation. This intervention was based on the 
premise that fully cost reflective tariffs incorporating the entire increase in electricity 






1.2 Research Area 
 
The research is theoretically founded in the theory that competitive market mechanisms 
deliver society welfare benefits most efficiently. The general competitive market 
equilibrium theory proved by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954), as cited in 
Amagashie (2006, p. 7) holds that a perfect market, with players having the same set of 
information and facts, leads to competitively determined prices.  The theory concludes 
that competitively determined prices ultimately provide maximum welfare benefits as 
society pays the price accordingly to its desire for the product. This state represents Pareto 
optimality.  
 
This argument supposes that interventions, such as the provision of electricity subsidies, 
which lead to pre-determined price levels, reduce the benefits to society, representing 
inefficiency and the lack of Pareto optimality. Competitive market equilibrium theory 
therefore, suggests that subsidies are costly to society and inefficient.  
 
However, an alternative theory holds that in the presence of incomplete or imperfect 
markets, private markets fail to provide goods desired by consumers (Stiglitz, 2000).  This 
school of thought argues that market failures sometimes necessitate Government 
intervention to move production to the maximum production frontier that reflects 
maximum societal benefit. The market pricing mechanism in this instance would have 
failed to ensure that societal benefits are maximized.  
 
The electricity supply shock that Uganda experienced in 2005 can be considered a case of 
market failure as new investments to replace declining supply could not be made 




seeks to investigate the evidence of the benefits or otherwise of electricity subsidies in 
Uganda as far as increasing social welfare, in the face of market failure.  
 
From an equity and distributional standpoint, the provision or removal of subsidies has 
been noted to have significant consequences for social welfare (Dufty, 2007). While this 
may hold in instances where electricity subsidies directly benefit significant segments of 
the population, the electricity subsidy policy in Uganda was largely directed to industrial 
end-user consumers. This was regarded as an intermediate point of intervention to ensure 
stability in the provision of goods to the general populations and the sustenance of 
government revenues. However, the efficacy of such a modality in delivering benefits 
equitably is in doubt, if significant profits were to be made from industrial firms which 
were supported by subsidies.  
 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Electricity subsidies were necessitated by drought in 2005 which severely reduced 
hydropower generation capacity, the major source of electrical power in Uganda, while 
electricity demand continued to grow. The provision of subsidies to the Uganda electricity 
sector has since been largely regarded as an unnecessary a drain on budgetary resources, 
given the significant opportunity costs for public spending. This is particularly evident 
from the relative magnitude of directs budget subsidies provided to electricity consumers. 
An estimated US$ 800 million – US$ 1 billion was spent on direct budget subsidies to 
electricity consumers between 2005 and 2011. This constitutes a significant amount, 
Uganda being a relatively small economy with an estimated GDP of USD 20 billion in 
2012 (UBOS, 2012). In comparison, the thirty-year Build Operate Transfer (BOT) 250 




almost 50% to Uganda’s generation capacity, was estimated to cost USD 900 million 
(International Finance Corporation, p. 2).  
 
Direct electricity subsidies therefore constituted significant budget resources that could 
have alternatively been allocated towards other priority public expenditure areas in 
Uganda, including critical infrastructure investments and public service delivery. 
Significant resources that could have addressed the country’s severe infrastructural deficits 
and other social service delivery needs were thus allocated to subsidies, for which rigorous 
justification is necessary. 
 
The magnitude of direct subsidies to electricity consumers was exacerbated by the increase 
in global prices of crude oil and, later on, the rapid depreciation of the Uganda Shilling 
against international currencies. These exogenous factors occurred while electricity 
consumers continued to pay fixed tariffs in the local currency, consequently increasing the 
subsidy requirement. On a year to year basis, electricity subsidy requirement increased 
with increasing demand far in excess of supply, as no significant increase in electricity 
tariffs, commensurate with electricity supply costs, was instituted.  
 
Consequently, the country was faced with increased blackouts and widespread electricity 
rationing, as Government failed to meet its electricity subsidy obligations. At the 
implementation of electricity subsidies in 2005, electricity shortages amounted to 40% of 
the total national installed capacity of 380 MW, with an effective output of only 120 MW 





While it was perceived that the absence of subsidies would have represented a significant 
shock to the Uganda economy in terms of lost production and a decline in public revenues, 
untargeted provision of subsidies represents inefficiencies as consumers able to pay higher 
electricity tariffs were not charged sufficiently high enough tariffs. This was especially so 
with given the skewed provision of electricity subsidies towards large industrial 
consumers, regardless of need. 
 
1.4 Purpose and Significance of the Research 
 
This study was country specific and was motivated by the need to undertake an empirical 
assessment of the costs and benefits of the relatively substantial electricity subsidies that 
were instituted in Uganda between 2005 and 2011. The electricity subsidy policy was 
pursued with the aim of sustaining economic production and government revenues in the 
face of a decline in electricity supply from traditional hydropower sources. Subsidies also 
arose from the need to shield increased electricity supply costs from consumers, as a result 
of reversion to alternative, but more expensive forms of power generation that could be 
quickly installed. The alternative sources of electricity supply were primarily petroleum-
fuel thermal based and were consequently more expensive than the traditional sources 
from hydropower based generation. 
 
The purpose of the research is therefore to study the relationship between electricity 
subsidies and Uganda’s industrial output and government revenues. The research also 
attempts to ascertain the equitability of the electricity subsidization policy, as some of the 
target beneficiaries received disproportionately larger proportion of the subsidy, regardless 
of their respective ability to pay. The extent of inequity needs to be investigated from an 




larger shares of electricity subsidies, while they continued earned substantial profits, as 
evidenced from their ability to pay taxes on profits.  
 
The increased perception that inequitable benefits accrued to beneficiaries of electricity 
subsidies, provides lessons, particularly for policy makers, in improving both the timing 
and targeting of electricity subsidies. This is in the likelihood that Uganda was to face 
electricity supply shocks in the future. The shocks would arise as power supply from 
cheaper generation sources is outstripped by growth in consumer demand, as cheaper 
renewable electricity infrastructure investments have long gestation periods and suffer 
delays in implementation, largely due to bureaucratic impediments. 
 
The study is premised on the rational that while the immediate necessity for subsidies was 
to alleviate rising costs for energy consumers, ensure continued economic production and 
protect Government revenues, there is an overriding need to ascertain the possible 
unintended consequences of the policy. This is pertinent in light of the opportunity costs 
for the alternative use of limited government budgetary resources on relatively more 
deserving social services and infrastructure investments. Furthermore, the electricity 
subsidy policy may have encouraged less efficient use of electricity, leading to increased 
demand far beyond what it would have been had its end-user price been more cost 
reflective. The research therefore also hopes to draw lessons from the inappropriate 
targeting of electricity subsidies. 
 
Electricity tariffs were subsequently increased in 2012 to more cost reflective levels in the 
midst of increasingly discerned opportunity costs of public resources spent on electricity 




shocks in electricity supply that may compel government to institute electricity price 
subsidies in the future. This is relevant  in view of the limited flexibility there is to quickly 
bring on-stream affordable sources of electricity generation capacity., It is envisaged that 
this research will elucidate better mechanisms that target and ensure the timing for 
electricity subsidies are both equitable and not onerous to other deserving public priorities, 
as the likelihood of shortfalls in electricity supply are envisaged in the long term. 
 
1.5 Research Questions and Scope 
 
The objectives of the research are therefore twofold as detailed below:- 
1. To establish the relationship between government revenues, industrial output 
and electricity subsidies; and 
2. To provide an insight into the appropriateness of targeted electricity subsidies 
in the future 
In order to achieve the research objectives enumerated above, the following research 
questions will be investigated in the Uganda context:- 
1. What is the relationship between government revenues and electricity 
subsidies?  
2. What is the relationship between industrial output and electricity subsidies?  
3. Have electricity subsidies been equitable in light of the disproportionate 
incidence among electricity end users in favour of largely industrial electricity 
consumers? 
 
1.6 Research Assumptions 
 
The research assumptions are that government revenues depend significantly on industrial 




contribution amounts to 34 per cent of total revenues. Consequently, the industrial sector in 
Uganda received a larger portion of the subsidies over the period under investigation.  
 
A further assumption made is that industrial output contributes to social welfare given the 
premise that the goods that are produced are socially desirable. It is also assumed that there 
is a significant relationship between electricity use and industrial output. 
 
Furthermore, the working definition of subsidies in the proposed research includes only 
direct transfers from government, as a result of explicit budgetary allocations. This 
definition excludes subsidies provided through tax exemptions for fuel used in the 
generation of power from fossil fuel based electricity generation (Kitson, Wooders and 





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
General competitive economic theory postulates that subsidies are inefficient because the 
ultimate benefit to society is less than the social costs of the subsidy, in the absence of 
market failures or imperfections (Katz & Rosen, 1994). Accordingly, in the fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics, the first theorem is that an economy is Pareto efficient if 
it is competitive, among other conditions. (Stiglitz, 2000). Central to this theorem is that 
competitively determined market prices, under ideal conditions, lead to a Pareto optimal 
allocation of resources. 
 
However, the presence of market failure or imperfection markets at least, justifies the use 
of subsidies to maximise social benefit (Ross, 1991; Grogan 2004). Therefore as a result of 
market imperfections or even failure, it can be argued that society’s benefits from 
electricity consumption could only be maintained at increased costs of its supply.  This 
would create positive electricity production externalities, without the producer being 
compensated for the increased costs. This consequently dis-incentivises the producer, 
resulting into lower and therefore a sub-optimal production of electricity, which would 
translate into lower benefits to society. This phenomenon is otherwise known as a “dead 
weight” loss to society and would justify the provision of a subsidy to electricity producers 
in order to mitigate increased costs of electricity production.  
 
2.2 Economic Theory and Electricity Subsidies 
 
A large body of literature supports competitive general equilibrium theory that suggests 
that price subsidy interventions, such as public electricity subsidies, as are socially 
inefficient. Kerkela (2004, p.7) contends that the liberalization of electricity tariffs is 




that electricity markets are sufficiently efficient to allow free entry and exit of electricity 
producers and consumers at any given tariff levels.  However, inordinately long 
equilibrium transmission mechanisms peculiar to energy markets reduces the efficiency of 
the market mechanism, as it takes substantial time for investment and consumption entry 
and/or exit decisions to be actually be realized.  
 
The transmission mechanism to equilibrium in electricity markets is a matter that is not 
taken cognisance of in the efficient market argument. Electricity producers require a 
considerable amount of time to fully execute investments in generation projects that 
translate into actual production of electricity, even for the smaller , comparatively lower 
cost and less complex projects. 
 
Kosmos (1987, p. 8) maintains that the prevention of the attainment of cost reflective 
electricity prices, causes a drain on government resources, promotes excessive demand, 
and encourages resource depletion.  This resonates with global experience given the 
tendency for governments which take a short term perspective to cost reflective prices. 
Governments in this respect would seek protect consumers from the actual costs of 
electricity they consume. Electricity consumers in tis circumstance therefore have no 
incentive to maximize efficiency in the use of subsidized electricity, which they would 
perceive as a public good. This leads to a needlessly excessive demand for resources and 
consequently excessive resource depletion. This argument is reinforced by Ritschel and 
Smestad (2003) who contend that electricity consumers insulated from market prices will 





The absence of a longer term perspective to the cost of electricity subsidies by 
governments would ultimately reveal opportunity costs arising from maintenance of 
subsidies. Bacon, Ley and Kojima (2010, p. 7) confirm that large energy subsidies 
represent severe opportunity costs, as they preclude spending on other deserving services. 
The totality of subsidies provided to support electricity tariffs from a long term 
perspective, would reveal the extent to which deserved spending on high priority areas 
could have been undermined. 
 
In addition to the burden on public finances, the United Nations (2003) notes that 
subsidies, stem the potential of economic growth as they weaken the foreign trade balance 
and undermine investment in the energy sector, while also impeding energy conservation 
as they discourage efficiency both in supply and demand through promotion of non-
economic consumption of energy.  
 
The foregoing body of literature suggests that electricity subsidies lower societal benefits 
and prominently places at the forefront, arguments for the removal of energy subsidies 
towards more cost reflective levels to encourage energy efficiency. Kerkela (2004, p. 11) 
therefore argues for reform in energy markets through removal of electricity subsidies, to 
enhance market competitiveness. All things equal, this should increase demand, reduce 
costs of production and costs of importation of fuel in case of fuel based electricity 
generation. This suggests that an economy becomes more efficient with fewer subsidies 
and therefore supports the argument that there would be higher societal benefits in line 






2.3 Market Mechanisms, Social Welfare and Subsidies 
 
In the presence of incomplete or imperfect markets, however, private markets fail to 
provide goods desired by consumers (Stiglitz, 2000).  The market pricing mechanism in 
this circumstance does not ensure that societal benefits are maximized. Stiglitz, (2000) 
argues that this sometimes necessitates Government intervention to move production to 
the maximum production frontier that reflects maximum societal benefit. Market failure is 
depicted in instances where in the absence of sufficient supply of a good, less quantity of 
the good is produced compared to the quantity required by society. This consequently 
leads to higher prices being charged to establish market equilibrium, for which subsidies 
are necessary for a merit good, in order to allow prices to be reduced and greater 
quantities produced for increased societal benefit.  
 
Furthermore, the General Theory of Second Best by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956), cited in 
Amegashie (2006), posits that any conditions that do not allow for a socially efficient 
level of production, or Pareto optimality, allows the violation of free market pricing 
principles. The conditions include imperfect or incomplete markets (Stiglitz, 2002), or 
conditions that present barriers to free entry (United Nations, 2003, p12). Violating 
market principles through provision of subsidies restores Pareto optimality, in order to 
increase social welfare.  
 
Stiglitz (2002) however, notes that achieving efficient outcomes or socially desirable 
levels of production determined through competitive equilibrium market is precluded 
most especially in developing economies, given the restrictive conditions that drive ideal 
market models. The need to redistribute resources among individuals provides a 
justification for the role of the public sector in more developed economies, in addition to 




constraints to the ideal conditions provides compelling arguments against over-reliance on 
the market mechanism to provide socially optimal welfare. The United Nations (2003, 
p.12) also argues that from a practical standpoint energy markets left on their own do not 
work perfectly and that subsidies can be justified if social welfare is increased.  
 
2.4 The Energy-Income Nexus 
 
A body of literature also seeks to establish the casual relationship between energy 
consumption and economic growth. In an empirical study of Pakistan’s energy-income 
nexus, Jamil and Ahamad (2010, p. 1) recount numerous studies that contend that energy 
is an essential source of economic growth because it complements other factors of 
production, or and alternatively literature that argues that energy consumption is neutral. 
Interestingly it reveals that notes that empirical work in several countries arrive at mixed 
results, emerging  with neutral, bi-directional and uni-directional causality between the 
energy-income nexus. 
 
2.5 Perfect Market Mechanisms Deficiencies and the Electricity Market 
 
Electricity markets are also prone to adjustment lags. Adjustment lags arise from delays in 
implementing investment decisions that would augment electricity supply more cheaply 
than emergency power options. The delay in increasing electricity supply, as a result of 
increased demand using the market mechanism is therefore constrained by the time it 
takes adjustments to mature. This is especially evident in cases of electricity generation 
where, investments are complex in nature and the size of electricity capacity being built 
requires substantial lead times.  
 
The standard economic model that postulates an efficient market mechanism also suggests 




perspective, Borenstein and Holland (2003) contend that electricity markets are least 
inclined to behave as expected in standard market equilibrium theory of perfect markets as 
electricity prices paid by consumers cannot be adjusted as frequently to reflect changing 
costs of producing electricity. This is because electricity supply costs vary more 
frequently than end user prices can be changed, thus creating imperfect nature of 
electricity markets. This suggests that second best alternatives to the perfect market model 
need to be considered. 
 
2.6 Balancing Costs and Benefits of Subsidies 
 
While the benefits of subsidies can be established in terms of increasing social welfare, 
their ultimate cost is a major consideration. This requires an evaluation of both the costs 
and benefits of any subsidy to ascertain the overall impact. Amegashie (2006) posits that 
while appropriately targeted subsidies increase social welfare, this benefit must be 
balanced by the subsidy’s costs, broadly defined. It is noteworthy that even ardent 
opponents of electricity subsidies recognize that a host of factors, including revenue 
requirements, provide compelling political and economic reasons for the introduction of 
subsidies (Komos, 1987:7).  
 
2.7 Developing Country experiences with Electricity Subsidies 
 
Numerous developing country-level studies have been undertaken that assess the impact 
of energy subsidies in general on poverty, inflation, growth, public revenues and industrial 
competitiveness. Hope & Singh (1995), undertook an empirical assessment of the impact 
of energy price removals in Malaysia, Indonesia, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Columbia and 
Turkey. They conclusively establish that the removal of energy subsides significantly 




assessment of subsides, the World Bank (2010) reveals that large energy subsidies 
compete for limited resources that could otherwise be used for other developmental needs. 
 
Saboohi (1999), in an evaluation of the impact of reducing energy subsidies on living 
expenses of households in Iran, reveals that energy subsidies lead to market distortions 
and welfare loses. The additional financial resources would otherwise be available for 
allocation directly to competing needs, including the compensation for the decreased 
purchasing power of Iranian households incurring higher energy costs.  
 
Hope & Singh (1995) further reveal that the impact of removing electricity subsides on 
industrial firms in developing countries is modest, since energy costs as a share of total 
company expenses typically range from 0.5 to 3 percent with a typical value of 1.5 
percent. In addition, they established that industrial firms were flexible enough to find 
substitutes when energy prices increases. The World Bank (2010) further confirms that 
subsidies promote non-economic consumption of energy, among other undesirable effects. 
The overall impact on industrial output revealed that industrial output increased even with 
higher energy prices, implying that the impact of higher prices was modest. They are, 
however, exceptions to this especially for energy intensive industries, for which energy 
constitutes a substantial portion of operating costs.  
 
However, subsidies have been used in developing countries to make electricity affordable 
to the poor and improve electricity access.  Vivien & Yepes (2006) reveal that upto 70 per 
cent of households in India and Africa could have expected to have difficulties in paying 
full costs recoveries for electricity. Similarly, 50 per cent of lower income Latin American 





2.8 Equity and Subsidies 
 
The equitability of electricity subsidies is ascertained by establishing the relative benefits 
that accrue to households distinguished by their relative income levels, a case of vertical 
equity. According to the Word Bank (2010), the social performance of an energy subsidy 
can be evaluated from three stand-points: how well   subsidies comparatively benefit poor 
households, or benefit incidence; the proportion of poor households receiving the subsidy, 
or beneficiary incidence; and the size or materiality of the subsidy to poor households. 
The extent to which electricity subsidy are vertically equitable can be evaluated by how 
well the poor are targeted (Bacon, et. al., 2010, p. 10).  
 
Vertical equity in electricity access is therefore pertinent in the Uganda since only 12 per 
cent of the country is connected to the national grid, largely in relatively wealthier urban 
areas. The benefits of electricity price subsidies therefore accrue to better-off income 
segments of the Ugandan population.  Limited electricity access is characteristic of 
developing countries as the Uganda case does not differ significantly from the rest of sub-
Saharan Africa, which recorded electricity access in sub-Saharan Africa at only 17 per 
cent, with rural arrears access housing most of the population only at 5 per cent (Ogunlade 
& Mwakasonda, 2004).  
 
Komives et. al. (2006) empirically establishes that the distributional incidence of 
electricity subsidies delivered through electricity tariffs, has been found to be regressive. 
This is even aggravated for quantity-based subsidies that are most highly regressive. 




electricity access leaves many poor households excluded, hindering the effectiveness of 
consumption subsidy schemes.  
 
Hope & Singh (1995) reveal that the impact of subsidies on various household income 
levels depends on energy’s share in the household budget and its price elasticity of 
demand. Their study contends that electricity share of household budgets decline at higher 
income level. In addition, they established that energy consumption increases with 
incomes. This suggests that end-user electricity subsidies benefit wealthier households 
more.  The removal of electrical subsidies in this circumstance would restore income 
parity between income segments of the population. However, the higher share of 
electricity in lower income household budgets leads to lower benefits accruing to them, if 
subsidies were to be removed, without alternative measures being instituted to protect 
them. Interventions for lower income households could be based on lifeline charges for 
minimal thresholds of consumption, above which subsidies would not be applicable.   
 
2.9 Definition and Characteristics of Subsidies 
 
In order to assess the costs and benefits of electricity subsidies in Uganda, a clear 
understanding of the definitions of subsidies needs be established. Clarity from the 
literature is important in guiding the research in quantifying electricity subsidies.  
 
Electricity subsidies are defined from both a broad and specific standpoint. Broadly stated, 
any measure that keeps electricity prices for consumers below market-clearing levels, or 
in the alternative, above market levels for electricity producers is considered a subsidy 
(United Nations, 2003).  Other broad definitions of subsidies refer to any policies that 




to economic agents (World Bank, 2010, p.8). Other literature, however, provides more 
specific definitions of subsidies that permit adequate assessment and measurement. 
Kosmos (1987, p. 7) makes a distinct difference between economic and financial 
subsidies.  Financial subsidies result from Government payouts to cover operating costs, 
to which tax rebates on fuel imports used for electricity generation. This is distinct from 
the definition of economic subsidies which includes the “opportunity costs of foregoing 
transactions at higher market prices (Kosmos, 1987, p.7). Kitson et al. (2011, p. 13) also 
identifies financial subsidies as all forms of financial support, including tax incentives, 
that accrue to electricity generation. The investigation uses financial subsidies in assessing 
the impact of electricity subsidies in Uganda, as they are more easily measurable.  
 
2.10 Conclusion  
The literature reviewed raises the need for consideration of the conditions and limits under 
which subsidies could be instituted. The arguments for and against the provision of 
subsidies enumerated above motivate the investigation of conditions under which 
subsidies were necessary in the Uganda context. The context of the investigation is the 
drawback that arises with the maintenance of electricity subsidies leading to significant 
impact on public finance and undesirable electricity consumption patterns. The relative 
costs and benefits of electricity subsidies therefore, need to be examined, before any 






3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1 Research Approach  
 
The study used a quantitative approach to answer the research questions that were posed. 
The investigation relied on theory to explain the observations that have been made with 
respect to the Uganda electricity subsidy experience. The theory enables the deduction of 
hypotheses to be tested, which in turn enables the evaluation of the outcome of the 
investigation. The findings of the investigation enable views about the applicability of the 
theory in the specific Ugandan circumstance to be drawn.  
 
3.2 Research Strategy and Design  
 
a) Research Design 
The research sought to establish the justification of incurring the electricity subsidies 
between 2005 and 2012 in order to support industrial output and to maintain an necessary 
government revenues. The research design is premised on the fact that Industrial Output 
provides a source of tax revenue to meet public spending needs. Industrial output is 
therefore related to public revenues. An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression model was therefore used. 
 
The other aspect of the research sought to establish vertical equity with respect to the 
beneficiaries of the subsidies in relation to the income levels. The research approach to 
evaluating equity aspects of electricity subsidies ideally assesses the benefit incidence 
resulting from the product of the share of connected poor households that receive 
subsidies and the average rate of subsidization (World Bank, 2010). While beneficiary 
incidence is usually based on household level data, the study used the ability to generate 




in comparison to the level of electricity subsidy amounts received by industrial consumer 
categories.  
 
The research therefore seeks to establish the relationship between electricity subsidies 
provided to industrial categories relative to the level of corporate income tax paid, in 
order to assess the extent of vertical equity. Corporate Income is used as a proxy to 
reflect the income levels of enterprises for which production data has been reported. The 
corporate income tax paid by respective subsectors of the economy is also a reflection of 
the profitability of the economic activity which they have been engaged in. The research 
investigated the relationship between the level of corporate income tax paid to the 
electricity subsidies received by respective subsectors. This enabled the provision of an 
insight into the level of the vertical equity in the provision of electricity subsidies, given 
qualitative studies that have noted electricity as a major constraint to economic activity.  
 
In addition, the investigation evaluated the equity aspects of the electricity subsidization 
policy from the perspective of cross subsidies among electricity consumer categories. 
This does not detract from the regressive nature of electricity subsidies arising from the 
fact that electricity price subsidies benefit better off segments of the Ugandan population 
connected to the national grid. 
 
b) Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 
The research questions that arise from the above strategy are the following: 
1. What is the relationship between tax revenue collections from Uganda’s 






2. How equitable have electricity subsidies been in relation to the incomes of 
beneficiaries? 
 
The research is restricted to an investigation of financial, rather than economic subsidies 
given the dearth of data on economic subsidies. The research is predicated on the 
prepositions that electricity subsidies have been necessary for the maintenance of public 
revenues and industrial output in Uganda. The dependent variable is public revenues. 
Electricity subsidies and industrial output are the independent variables. A further 
proposition is that targeted electricity subsidies are not equitable between end-user 
beneficiaries.  
 
The hypotheses for this research are therefore as follows:-  
 
H01:  Government revenues are not affected by electricity subsidies and industrial output. 
 
H02: High Income electricity users are not affected by electricity subsidies  
 
3.3 Model Estimation 
 
3.3.1 Model 1: Excise Tax Revenues and Electricity Subsidies 
 
In Model 1 focuses on the effect of electricity subsidies and industrial output on 
government revenues, in order to answer the research questions pertaining to the 
relationship between these variables. From a logical standpoint, Model 1 postulates that 
Excise Tax Revenues are a function of Industrial Output and Electricity Subsidies. The 
selection of these explanatory variables to Excise Tax Revenues is made based on the 




Uganda from 2005. Furthermore, the logical relationship between government revenues 
and excise taxes as taxes on industrial output is pertinent, given that 30 per cent of 
government revenues in Uganda  are from the manufacturing sub-sector alone. 
 
Regression Model 1 is the regression model used to test the hypothesis of the relationships 
between the Electricity Subsidies and Excise Tax Revenues. The study assumes that the 
variables in Model 1 are stationary; therefore, a simple OLS model may be adequate to 
explain the relationship.  
 
Model 1 is a three variable regression function represented as:- 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 =  𝑏0 +  𝑏1 + 𝐼𝑂 +  𝑏2𝐼𝐸𝑆 +  𝑏3𝐸𝑆 + 𝑒  
 
 The variables of the basic model are described as follows:- 
 
ETR: represents Excise Tax Revenues, which is the dependant variable in the model 
IO: represents The Index of Industrial Production, which is the dependant variable in 
the model 
IES: represents Industrial Electricity Sales, which is the dependant variable in the 
model 
ES: represents Electricity Subsidies, which is the dependant variable in the model 
𝒃𝟎: represents the regression intercept coefficient 
𝒃𝟏: represents the co-efficient of the Industrial Output variable 
𝒃𝟐: represents the co-efficient of the Industrial Electricity Sales variable  
𝒃𝟑: represents the co-efficient of the Electricity Subsidy variable  






3.3.2 Model 2: Corporate Tax Revenues and Electricity Subsidies 
 
In Model 2, is the study investigates the relationship between Annual Fiscal Year 
Electricity Subsidies and Annual Fiscal Year Corporate Tax Revenues. Annual corporate 
revenues are used in Model 2 as collections of corporate taxes are seasonal, with 
collections largely being registered at the end and middle of the fiscal year. Model 2 seeks 
to establish evidence for the overall profitability of the manufacturing sub-sector over the 
period under investigation, since the electricity subsidies disproportionately favoured 
industrial end-users. Evidence of the ability of the manufacturing sector to make profit, and 
therefore meet Corporate Income Tax obligations is a necessary condition to establish the 
conclusion of the vertical equitability or lack thereof. This is pertinent in view of the 
subsidy provision benefits disproportionately the larger end-user electricity consumers.  
 
The study assumes that the variables used in Model 2 are stationary; therefore, a simple 
OLS model may be adequate to explain the relationship. 
 
Model 2 is a two variable regression function represented as: 
𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑅 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐴𝐼𝐸𝑆 + 𝑏2𝐴𝐸𝑆 +  𝑒 
 
ACTR: represents Annual Corporate Tax Revenue collections from the manufacturing 
sub-sector, which is the dependant variable in the model  
AIES: represents Annual Fiscal Year Industrial Electricity Sales, which is a dependant 
variable in the model  
AES: represents Annual Fiscal Year Electricity Subsidies, which is a dependant 
variable in the model 




𝒃𝟏: represents the co-efficient of the Annual Fiscal Year Industrial Electricity Sales 
variable in the model  
𝒃𝟐: represents the co-efficient of the Annual Fiscal Year Industrial Electricity 
Subsidies ales variable in the model 
e: represents the regression error term in the regression model  
 
3.4 Data Collection, Frequency and Choice of Data 
 
The study used secondary data collected mainly from official Ugandan agency sources. 
secondary data collected from the Bank of Uganda, the Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA), the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) and Ministries of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development (MFPED) and that of Energy and Mineral Development.  Data 
was also obtained from the main electricity distribution segment concessionaire, Umeme 
Limited. Data for the research includes quarterly data between 2005 and 2011 for the 
following data variables:- 
1. End-User Subsidies data from the Uganda Electricity Regulatory Authority 
(ERA) 
2. Excise and Corporate Tax Revenue Collections from the Uganda Revenue 
Authority (URA)  
3. Formal Manufacturing Sub-Sector Production Data from the Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics  (UBOS) 
 
The investigation undertook an analysis of secondary data obtained from official sources 
in order to investigate the relationships between key variables during the period under 




which respectively represent the benefits to society for the former, and to a specific high 
income group of interest in the investigation of vertical equity in the latter case.  
 
The Excise Tax Revenue variable is a proxy for societal benefits, as excise taxes translate 
into a source for spending on public goods and social welfare. The Excise Tax variable 
served as the dependant variable in model investigating the costs and benefits of 
electricity subsidies. The dependant variables comprised of Industrial output, which is the 
basis for excise tax revenues; industrial energy sales, and electricity subsidies. 
 
Electricity subsidies in the model were treated as a cost to society to the extent that they 
directly represent a reduction in the amount available for social spending, if they do not 





The investigation used both quarterly and fiscal year revenue data and quarterly 
production indices from Uganda’s manufacturing sub-sector. Electricity subsidies data 
was obtained from quarterly data provided by the Electricity Regulatory Authority during 
the period under investigation. The electricity subsides are indicated for domestic, 
commercial medium and large consumer categories, in addition to street lighting and very 
large industrial concerns for which data is insignificant or no subsidy provision had been 
made.  
 
While the subsidy provisions for each end-user category were provided for apriori in 
ERA’s Quarterly Tariff announcements, actual provisions differed substantially from 




user consumers received disproportionately larger portions of the subsidy. Twenty one 
out of a total of the thirty observations of industrial end-user subsidy provisions over the 
period under investigations, revealed an average share of 63 per cent accruing to 
industrial consumers, with a range range from 59 per cent to 95 per cent of the entire 
subsidy provision (see Appendix ). This reflects significant levels of cross subsidisation 
among beneficiaries of subsidies. The provision of larger electricity subsidies to medium 
and large industrial consumer categories disproportionate to other domestic and 
commercial electricity consumers provides a greater, though partial understanding of the 
relationships being investigated.  
 
3.6 Data Analysis  
 
In this analysis, primary emphasis was placed on the distinctive impact of electricity 
subsidies and excise and corporate tax revenues. The Excise Tax variable was used a 
proxy for the benefits to the society. Corporate Tax Revenue was used as a proxy for the 
ability to pay in investigating the extent of vertical equity.   After data collection, data 
was entered into Excel and analysis done using Excel’s Data Analysis tool.   
 
The method that was employed in the data analysis is a regression analysis of the data 
variables to establish relationships between them (Gujarati (1999; 2003). The approach 
sought to establish any relational aspects from which explanations could be induced. 
 
Key to the analysis was the evaluation of the results of the regression using statistical 
tests to determine how best the results explain the theoretical underpinnings of the 
investigations. Each of the research questions was evaluated. An overall conclusion was 





The evaluation of the results sought to confirm of goodness of fit of the regression to the 
estimated model and the statistical significance of the estimated parameters of the model. 
Checks of goodness of fit was assessed using the R-squared analyses of the pattern of 
residuals and ultimately, tested the hypotheses postulated. The statistical significance of 
the model was checked by an F-test for the regression model’s overall fit, in addition to t-




The research may be limited by the availability of data on all the variables on a quarterly 
basis to enable sufficient number of observations to allow useful econometric analysis 
using time series regression analysis.  
 
The research is also limited to assessing equitability among categories of electricity 
consumers using benefit incidence to investigate the relative impact of electricity 
subsidies on different categories of electricity consumers in order to determine the 
equitability or lack thereof of the electricity subsidy policy in Uganda. 
 
Adams et. al. (2004) notes several disadvantages of secondary data that have become 
manifest during the investigations. These include:  
 
1. Data Compatibility:- The lack of data compatibility, arising from the available 
information not matching  what is required for the investigation.  
2. Data coverage:- The inadequacy of the data and information to cover all subjects or 




3. Data In-availability or Lack of Depth: Obtaining early period data was problematic 
with inadequacies that required omission of odd data to enable understanding of the 
effect on investigation. 
4. Data Consistency: the data and information was not available from all time periods as 











The empirical results of the regression models are presented and statistically evaluated to 
ascertain the adequacy and performance of the model. The effects of electricity subsidies 
on government revenues is assessed, and thereafter the effects of the control variable 
industrial electricity sales on government outputs. The hypotheses are then tested against 
empirical results.    
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis below provides an empirical view of the performance of the Uganda 
industrial output, electricity subsidies and corporate and excise government revenues 
during the period. 
 
 











































































Figure 1 generally depicts an increasing trend in excise tax revenue collections for the 
entire period under investigation. Seasonality in excise tax collections is observed, with 
distinct peaks in collection in the first quarter of most of the years. This reflects increased 




Source: Uganda Revenue Authority 
 
Corporate tax revenues depict an increasing trend during the period as shown in Figure 2. 
It is noteworthy that an increasing trend in corporate tax collections is recorded in the later 


















Source: Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
The Index of Industrial Production shows an increasing trend over the period under 
investigation. From a general standpoint, it reveals that industrial output increased over 
the period without marked deceleration in industrial output growth. Of interest to the 
investigation is the extent to which this increasing growth in industrial output is related to 




















































































































































Figure 4 shows that Industrial electrical sales exhibited an increasing trend over the period 
under investigation. The figure reveals that electricity sales to the industrial subsector wer 
maintained at an increasing trend. It suggests that Government’s electricity subsidization 
policy was successful in availing electricity for industrial production. The extent of the 
relationship between industrial electricity sales and subsidies would enable the 
understanding of the role of subsidies in maintaining industrial electricity sales. 
 
 
Source: Electricity Regulatory Authority 
 
The total electricity subsidy depicts an overall increase during the period though with 
significant fluctuations. 
 














































































Table 1: Model 1 Summary Statistics 
 
ETR CTR IES IOP ES 
            
Mean 60.8291 72.9070 203.3271 159.0929 34.4021 
Standard Error 3.3623 11.8898 10.8932 4.5177 5.7609 
Median 60.0918 53.2081 198.5588 163.1748 23.2343 
Standard Deviation 18.4160 65.1229 59.6643 24.7444 31.5537 
Sample Variance 339.1492 4240.9885 3559.8288 612.2852 995.6365 
Kurtosis -0.7441 1.0250 0.5067 -1.3885 2.0014 
Skewness 0.3472 1.2283 -0.2737 -0.0498 1.7452 
Range 69.1314 236.4438 267.0140 75.9812 108.8306 
Minimum 32.8647 7.4653 40.6810 122.4735 5.1311 
Maximum 101.9962 243.9091 307.6950 198.4547 113.9618 
Sum 1824.8721 2187.2102 6099.8122 4772.7867 1032.0625 
Count 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 30.0000 
Confidence Level(95.0%) 6.8766 24.3173 22.2790 9.2397 11.7823 
 
Kurtosis measures suggest standard normal distributions for the variables used in the 
investigation, except for the Electricity Subsidies variable.. The standard normal 
distributions for the variables is further reinforced by the low level of skewness around 
zero for the all the variables with the exception of electricity subsidies variable. The 
relatively higher kurtosis and skewness of the Electricity Subsidy variable reveals the 
extent of its variability. 
 
4.3 Effects of Electricity Subsidies on Excise Tax Revenues  
4.3.1 Model 1’s Empirical Results 
 
Table 2: Excise Tax Subsidy Model (Model 1) Regression Results  
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value 
Intercept -32.9120 8.8271 -3.7285 0.0009 
IES 0.1036 0.0387 2.6789 0.0126 
IOP 0.4464 0.0903 4.9435 0.0000 
ES 0.0481 0.0418 1.1512 0.2601 
          
R Square 0.904 Adjusted R Square 0.8928 
Durbin Watson         





Regression results in Table 2 suggest that the independent variables explain about 89.3% 
of the variations in the dependent variable. The probability of the F-statistic (0.0000) 
shows that the model was not very perfectly specified but there is no statistical evidence 
to justify misspecification.  
 
The regression gives a short-term of Model in the form:- 
𝐸𝑇𝑅2005−11 = −32.91 +  0.1036 𝐼𝐸𝑆 +  0.4464 𝐼𝑂𝑃 +  0.0481 𝐸𝑆 
                                                               (2.6789)               (4.9435)            (1.1215) 
 
The empirical results in Table 2 suggest a positive relationship between Excise Tax 
Revenues, Industrial Energy Sales and Electricity Subsidies. The results of the estimation 
reveal a positive relationship between the performance of excise tax revenues on the one 
hand, and electricity subsidies and industrial output, on the other.  
 
It suggests that a unit increase in excise tax revenues was related to a 10.4 percent 
increase in Industrial Electricity Sales (IES); a 44.6 per cent increase in Industrial Output 
(IOP) and a 4.8 per cent increase in Electricity Subsidies (ES) during the period under 
observation.  
 
Based on the estimators of the Electricity Subsidies variable, there is sufficient evidence 
to infer that the Electricity Subsidies is linearly related to Excise Tax Revenues. 
Electricity Subsidies have significant effects in Model 1, which is logically acceptable, as 
it conforms to a priori expectations. The large t-statistic value for the Electricity Subsidies 
coefficient (1.1215) relative to its coefficient value (0.0481) suggests that the null 




Industrial Output relative to their respective co-efficients indicates that the corresponding 
coefficient is not zero and therefore that the null hypothesis can be rejected.  
 
Furthermore, the probability values for the t-statistics of the respective coefficient are 
small, providing further evidence that respective coefficient is non-zero. Specifically, the 
probability of the estimator for electricity subsidies is relatively small (0.2601), which is 
further evidence that the coefficient is not zero. It can be concluded, therefore that 
electricity subsidies affected excise tax revenues during the period under investigation. 
 
4.3.2 Test of Model 1’s Validity  
 
The regression’s coefficient of determination which indicates the goodness-of-fit of 
Model 1 is very significant with an R2 of 90.4 per cent. The co-efficient of determination 
indicates the very high explanatory power of the model of the relationship between Excise 
Tax Revenues, Electricity Subsidies and Industrial Output. In addition, the adjusted 
coefficient of determinations, which penalizes the model for any excess of the number of 
regressors that do not add to the explanatory power of the regression (adjusted R2), is 
quite close to the R-squared at 89.3 per cent.  Model 1 significantly explains a very high 
proportion of the variation in those outputs, leaving a small portion unexplained. This 
suggests that the model is reasonable to a very large extent. 
 
The F-statistic of the model is significant at one percent significance level, as it is close to 
zero, providing confidence that the model fit the data generally well. The large F-value 
(81.472) suggests that the evidence is inconsistent with the null hypothesis, providing 
grounds for its rejection.  The probability (p-value) of the F value (2.4 x 10-13) is 
sufficiently smaller than the significance level of 1 percent, allowing the null hypothesis 




suggests that electricity subsidies positively affected excise tax revenue collections during 
the period under investigation.   
 
The Standard Error of Estimates (S.E) of each of the variable Model 1 are particularly 
small compared to the means of the dependent variables. This gives the assurance that the 
model is fairly good enough for making accurate and meaningful conclusions. 
 
4.4 Effects of Electricity Subsidies on Corporate Tax   
 
4.4.1 Model 2’s Empirical Results 
 
Table 3: Regression Results using Corporate Taxes 






Intercept 8.2480 12.9677 0.6360 0.5527 
AIES 0.0621 0.0253 2.4578 0.0574 
AES 0.1480 0.0851 1.7392 0.1425 
R Square 0.9047 Adjusted R Square 0.8665 
F 23.7193 Significance F 0.0028 
 
 
The short form of Model 2 can therefore be represented as follows:- 
𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑅2005−11 = 8.248 + 0.621𝐴𝐼𝐸𝑆 +  0.1480 𝐴𝐸𝑆 
                                                             (2.4578)               (1.7392)                
  
The empirical results of the estimates in Model 2 suggest that there is sufficient evidence 
to infer that the Electricity Subsidies positively affected Corporate Tax Revenues paid by 
the Uganda manufacturing sub-sector during the period under investigation. This suggests 
that the sub-sector receiving the larger share of electricity subsidies was sufficiently 
profitable during the period under investigation. The relatively large t-statistic value for 
the Electricity Subsidies coefficient (1.7392) compared to its coefficient value (0.1480) 




subsidies affected Corporate Tax revenues from the manufacturing sub-sector, thereby 
accepting the alternative hypothesis. The probability of the estimator for electricity 
subsidies is very small (0.1425) which can be taken as evidence that coefficient is non-
zero.  
 
The empirical results suggest a positive relationship between Annual Corporate Tax 
Revenues paid by the manufacturing sub-sector, Annual Industrial Energy Sales and 
Annual Fiscal Year Electricity Subsidies. Table 2 shows a positive relationship between 
Corporate Income Tax revenues and electricity subsidies. It suggests that a unit increase in 
Corporate Income Tax revenues was related to a 14.8 percent increase in electricity 
subsidies (ES) and a 6.2 per cent increase in Industrial Energy Sales (IES) during the 
period under observation.  
 
4.4.2 Test of Model 2’s Validity  
 
The regression’s coefficient of determination for the Model 2, which reflects the 
‘goodness-of-fit’ of the regression is very significant with an R2 of 90.5 per cent. The co-
efficient of determination indicates the very high explanatory power of the model of the 
relationship between Corporate Tax Revenues, Electricity Subsidies and Industrial Energy 
use.The adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R2) is also very high and close to 
the R-squared at 86.7 per cent.  The model significantly explains a very high proportion of 
the variation between the variables, leaving a small portion unexplained. This suggests 
that the model is largely reasonable. 
 
The F-statistic of the model is significant at one percent significance level, as it is close to 
zero, providing confidence that the model fit the data generally well. The large F-value 




grounds for its rejection.  The probability (p-value) of the F value (0.003) is smaller than 
the significance level of 1 percent for the null hypothesis to be rejected, and consequently 
the acceptance alternative hypothesis.  This therefore suggests that electricity subsidies 
positively affected excise tax revenue collections during the period under investigation.   
 
The Standard Error of Estimates (S.E) of the dependent variables in Model 2 model are 
small compared to the means of the dependent variables. This gives the assurance that the 
model is fairly good enough for making accurate and meaningful conclusions. 
 
The large values of t-statistic for the Annual Electricity  Subsidies and Industrial 
Electricity Sales relative to their respective co-efficients indicates that the corresponding 
coefficient is not zero and therefore that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Furthermore, 
the probability values for the t-statistics of the respective coefficient are small, lending 






5 RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study sought to investigate the relationship between electricity subsides, on the one 
hand and industrial output and government revenues in Uganda between 2005 and 2011 
when electricity subsidies were pervasive. It also sought to ascertain the equitability of the 
electricity subsidy policy in view of limited electricity access across the country, and also 
because the subsidies were beneficial to larger industrial end-users. Excise Tax revenues, 
as a tax on industrial production, were used as a proxy for revenue performance in order 
to assess the effect of subsidies on overall revenue performance. An investigation of the 
relationship between corporate tax collections from the manufacturing sub-sector, and 
electricity subsides was undertaken, to assess the equitability of the policy. Corporate 
taxes were used as a proxy for the well-being of beneficiaries. 
 
Electricity subsidies were found to have positively affected both excise and corporate tax 
revenues and industrial output during the period under study. From the evidence, the 
overall objective of the electricity subsidy policy seems to have been attained, in as far as 
revenues base was protected and industrial output was maintained.  
 
The evidence also reveals that at a macro-level, electricity subsidies were positively 
related to end-user corporate tax revenues of the manufacturing sub-sector. This reveals 







6 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The evidence from the investigation shows that subsidy policy needs to be implemented 
after a careful study of the timing and targeted beneficiaries for the policy. Subsidy policy 
needs to be smarter to match the provision of the subsidy and the gap that needs to be 
addressed. This ultimately enables the minimization of the leakage of revenues that would 
otherwise be available for priority spending.   
 
The extent to which subsidy support could have been withdrawn to restore income parity 
between higher income end-users and the rest of the population needs to be further studied 
from a micro-level standpoint. Better targeting of subsidies ensures that they are provided 
to parties who need them. This will enable the subsidy policy to ensure vertical equity and 
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Appendix 1: Regression Results of Excise Tax Revenues, Industrial Sales and 
Electricity Subsidies  
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
      
       
Regression Statistics 
     
Multiple R 0.950711 
     
R Square 0.903852 
     
Adjusted R Square 0.892758 
     
Standard Error 6.03085 
     
Observations 30 
     
       
ANOVA 
      
  df SS MS F 
  
Regression 3 8889.678 2963.226 81.47189 
  
Residual 26 945.6498 36.37115 
   
Total 29 9835.328     
  
       
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 99.0% Upper 99.0% 
Intercept -32.912 8.827094 -3.72853 0.000945 -57.4400231 -8.384073332 
Industrial Electricity  Sales MWhrs 0.103634 0.038685 2.67888 0.012638 -0.00386214 0.211129518 
Index of Industrial Production 0.446373 0.090295 4.943489 3.9E-05 0.195468782 0.697278093 










     
Multiple R 0.9511311 
     
R Square 0.9046503 
     
Adjusted R Square 0.8665104 
     
Standard Error 11.71352 
     
Observations 8 
     
       
ANOVA 
      




Regression 2 6508.8793 3254.4397 23.719272 0.0028074 
 
Residual 5 686.03278 137.20656 
   
Total 7 7194.9121       
 
       
  Coefficients 
Standard 





Intercept 8.2480019 12.967678 0.6360431 0.5527188 -44.039532 60.535536 
Fiscal Year Industry Electricity 
Sales 0.0620929 0.0252638 2.4577812 0.0573848 -0.0397744 0.1639602 


























2005-Q1 36.48810635 21.30192959 40.68 122.4734972                        5.37  
                      
2.57  
2005-Q2 32.86473084 56.58629267 150.97 124.5518303                     11.56  
                      
6.26  
2005-Q3 36.98472066 21.329096 149.78 125.5243632                        8.30  
                      
4.76  
2005-Q4 38.69489727 70.50701771 212.45 130.7755875                        9.24  
                      
5.13  
2006-Q1 43.51996668 8.671439429 129.43 130.9320377                     25.79                     15.23  
2006-Q2 40.08232783 81.66629906 138.96 123.809757                     20.44                     14.04  
2006-Q3 39.36561046 7.465250421 142.65 128.5046306                     39.11                     25.13  
2006-Q4 44.76449189 78.91271504 151.23 134.9777865                     32.89                     24.52  
2007-Q1 51.41544064 12.81455395 167.45 143.0536905                     24.72                     23.37  
2007-Q2 49.79056502 95.81257631 174.34 137.7769027                     23.55                     16.97  
2007-Q3 47.84234428 14.886371 172.42 147.2272448                     17.95   n/a  
2007-Q4 49.81827482 95.96665606 179.07 152.702614                     21.85   n/a  
2008-Q1 63.22597811 14.88174414 190.73 153.8327396                     32.63   n/a  
2008-Q2 56.06962145 87.56335931 189.84 144.8204192                     22.92   n/a  
2008-Q3 56.14572479 9.977204278 202.63 158.8942785                     37.97   n/a  
2008-Q4 58.06179296 99.12090092 189.19 168.1182159                     54.94   n/a  
2009-Q1 66.28544584 17.96123411 194.49 177.6239744                     17.94  8.494 
2009-Q2 62.12172453 102.8993787 207.70 167.4553862                        5.13  3.303 
2009-Q3 66.51931389 18.63904963 213.36 176.131819                     13.89  8.925 
2009-Q4 65.422618 157.1039177 210.99 175.0991449                     17.83  10.216 
2010-Q1 69.84583716 30.13194629 214.73 178.3481937                     14.93  11.817 
2010-Q2 71.73492523 109.5038379 235.85 168.1525193                     28.40  19.036 
2010-Q3 73.62 49.83 253.80 176.1691987                     34.49  16.733 
2010-Q4 75.33 169.83 263.05 195.5492432                     43.62  26.007 
2011-Q1 85.33 44.11 268.04 198.4547102                  104.17  62.044 
2011-Q2 81.29 155.81 279.33 191.2093811                  113.96  67.88 
2011-Q3 86.64745697 30.12197225 289.83 182.460205                  100.82  67.623 
2011-Q4 88.70201507 234.2793544 282.36 174.7530251                  112.87  60.107 
2012-Q1 101.996157 45.61703426 296.78 191.8848249                     20.77  81.38126263 
2012-Q2 84.89200884 243.9090576 307.70 191.5194481                     14.02  n/a 
























FY2004/05 35.77875384 191.647 16.93009038 37.02232 
FY2005/06 45.96721328 630.619 63.7656383 47.45119 
FY2006/07 60.5130499 635.675 120.2731935 62.16962 
FY2007/08 59.68917012 732.0515 95.34161852 65.76709 
FY2008/09 74.30768162 794.0022 115.9862416 74.30768 
FY2009/10 74.06902737 874.9329 75.04566542 74.06903 
FY2010/11 112.5625286 1064.232 296.2470523 115.3036 
FY2011/12 129.4469079 1176.653 213.6883907 140.922 
 
 
